Terrorism Is Morally Unjustifiable By Stephen Nathanson

As paradoxical as it may seem (to most), it proves difficult to condemn terrorism and have a consistent, non-hypocritical way to judge it. Most definitions of terrorism lack the applicability of all instances of terrorism, there seems to be borderline exceptions which fall within the gray area of such definitions. Stephen Nathanson, in an effort to establish what makes terrorism wrong, bases one of his main arguments on that terrorists are thought to be dreadful because they intentionally seek innocent deaths, while others who kill innocents do so unintentionally (15). In this essay, I shall argue that Nathanson’s definition of innocence, which is mostly used as the core gauge of why terrorism is morally unjustifiable, is badly restricting in that it excludes the cases of political assassinations. Consequently, this insinuates that when using his definition of innocence, attacks on political figureheads may be morally justifiable if it is done for a just cause. To support thi s thesis I will argue that, although, political assassinations do not involve the killing of innocents they are, in most cases, morally unjustifiable contrary to what Nathanson’s argument insinuates. Moreover, I will consider how Nathanson may reply to my contention by objecting that political figureheads cannot be innocent given their political position and will address his rebuttal by demonstrating that within the context of society most of us are not innocent. Nathanson argues that terrorism cannot